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The Evolving Corporate Board
Murray Weidenbaum
In a period of takeover battles and dramatic
replacements of top managements, the role of
the corporate board of directors is rapidly
evolving into a major strategic force in American business.
Some companies have enacted "poison pill"
provisions, which put the board of directors
squarely in the middle of merger and acquisition battles. The directors adopt such a measure to discourage unwanted takeovers. The
"pill" is in the form of new rights to shareholders to acquire, at a marked discount, a large
equity stake in any successful suitor whose offer has not been approved by the company's
board. The new activism on the part of corporate directors rose in 1993 to include replacing
the chief executive officers for such industrial
giants as American Express, Eastman Kodak,
General Motors, and IBM.
The new burst of public attention to the corporate board, from friend and foe alike, is
matched by widespread ignorance - both of
how that important economic institution functions and how it has been changing in recent
years. Thus, it is appropriate to examine the
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evolving role of boards of directors, with special attention to the strengthening of the board
at a time when it is often the focal point of corporate response to external threats. Although I
present my own viewpoint, developed in part
from my service as a corporate director, much
of this report draws from many studies in law,
economics, and business administration.

Criticisms of the Board
Three major criticisms have been leveled at
the institution of the corporate board of directors.

Penn Central's directors seem to have done
very little to earn the $200 each received
each time he attended a board meeting. . . .
With few exceptions, they appeared to be
blind to the on-rushing events that sent the
Penn Central hurtling off the tracks. 5

Robert H. Malott, an experienced corporate
director and retired chief executive officer
(CEO), identifies the biggest barrier to effective
outside directorship as the "old boy" network
that dominates some boards. This makes it
personally unpleasant for directors to question
the performance of their peers "and often their
friends. " 6

The Board Is a Rubber Stamp
One retired board chairman of a successful
company describes the board of directors as the
1
"Achilles heel of the American corporation."
A leading scholar refers to the corporate board
2
as an "impotent legal fiction. "
The most frequently made criticism of the
corporate board of directors is that it is ceremonial, rubber-stamping the views of management. This belief comes from many sources.
In his 1948 classic study of large companies,
R.A. Gordon concluded that directors are
closer to top management than to the stockholders, and that ratification of management
3
proposals by the board is largely a formality.
He also reported that, as a result of its control
of the proxy machinery, it is more common for
management to select directors than vice versa.
Myles L. Mace, in his authoritative study of
corporate boards in the late 1960s, reported
that the role of directors is largely advisory and
not of a decision-making nature. He quotes
one company president as saying, "The board
of directors serves as a sounding board . . . .
4
The decision is not made by the board. "
An account of the bankruptcy of the Penn
Central reached an even stronger conclusion:

A closely related criticism is that the board's
deliberations are dominated by the CEO, who
typically also serves as chairman. When the
same person controls the agenda and conduct of
boardroom proceedings as well as the day-today performance of the company, the power of
the individual director may indeed become attenuated. Despite the rising number of outside
directors and special committees of corporate
boards, in most cases the center of power remains with the management. CEOs serve as
chairman of the board in 80 percent of the
larger corporations.
Management consultants report that many
directors act as part of top management, rather
than as monitors able and willing to reward and
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The "old boy" network that dominates
some boards makes it personally
unpleasant for directors to question
the performance of their peers.

The Board Is Dominated by the CEO

7

penalize management's performance. A longtime board member states that the ambiguity of
the role of the corporate board begins with the
prevailing combination of management leader8
ship and board leadership in the same person.

typically a group dominated by outside directors. What's wrong with that? Frequently,
those outside directors are senior officers of
other firms, who are very sympathetic to motions for generous treatment of their counterparts. Aside from the intrinsic merits of the
matter, their self-interest dictates such a stand.
After all, the compensation committees of their
own boards are often similarly composed of
CEOs of peer firms. Moreover, the management consultants advising those committees
take full account of such peer-group action by
the other boards. The ratchet effect that results
is quite obvious.
Other nominally independent outside directors, in practice, may represent another set of
special interests - those of the local community. Senior officers of local firms that primarily sell goods and services to the surrounding
area may see great value in the company donating lavishly to local causes, even if its markets
are national or international. Another serious
concern is the relationship of the inside directors to the chairman/CEO. After all, he is their
day-to-day supervisor, usually with the effective authority to radically change the directors'
role in the company and even to fire or demote
them. It is rare to see a subordinate officer
serving on a board dissent from the position
taken by the CEO.

The Board Is Plagued with Conflicts of
Interest
Corporate directors often are criticized for
conflicts of interest and for showing greater
concern for the welfare of other companies.
Many outside directors of corporations do business with the companies on whose board they
serve. The literature contains a number of
cases of apparent wrongdoing on the part of
outside directors who were also officers of
companies that supplied services to the corporation or who benefited unfairly from company
operations. 9
An analysis of 286 banks that failed in 1990
and 1991 revealed that, in 74 cases, the main
cause of the failure was fraud and other abuses
by directors and officers, such as receiving
loans at very low rates. In 101 other instances,
insider abuses contributed to the bank's insolvency.10
In the case of the Penn Central, a staff report of the Committee on Banking and Currency of the U.S. House of Representatives
censured the company's board members for
their excessive involvement in other corporate
boards. The Committee staff noted the subservience of many of the outside directors to
the interests of the financial institutions of
which they were officers. As corporate boards
shift to a larger percentage of outside directors,
the likelihood of such corporate "interlocks"
11
could increase.
In the case of the larger firms, a problem is
emerging in the form of opportunity for "backscratching" when setting management compensation. The board's compensation committee is

Ralph Nader's Proposals
Over the years, Ralph Nader and his colleagues have developed numerous ambitious
and far-reaching proposals to restructure the
corporation. To give "all stockholders in corporate decision-making a real voice in corpo-
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The Push for Reform
Criticisms of the board have led to a variety
of proposals to reform corporate governance:

rate governance," he advocates a Corporate
Democracy Act. Under this proposal, the federal government would assume the chartering
power now residing in the individual states.
Nader wants to install full-time outside directors who would take an active role in the gov. 12
ernance of the corporatiOn.
It is interesting to note that the charter of the
Equitable Life Insurance Company requires the
Chief Justice of New Jersey to appoint several
outside directors. Over the years, these appointees have included women civic leaders
and physicians, who are far from typical corporate directors. Under the Nader approach, individual directors would be assigned responsibility for specific areas of concern, such as the
environment or employee relations. In his concept, federal chartering would develop a
"constitutionalism" for corporate employees
and provide various protections for whistle
blowers who object to specific company activities. He also urges a mandatory mail plebiscite
of shareholders on all "fundamental" transactions.
The intent of his reforms, according to
Nader, is to address a concept of "social bankruptcy" whereby a company would be thrown
into receivership if it failed to meet its "social"
obligations.

board members, including the chairman, would
be chosen from outside the company. Williams's concept of outside directors excludes
bankers, lawyers, or anyone else having business dealings with the company. In his view,
outside-dominated boards could do a better job
of representing the stockholders' long-term interests than executives who are responsible for
day-to-day management.

Outside-dominated boards could do a better
job of representing the stockholders'
long-term interests.

The Geneen-Williams Proposals
More modest- yet quite substantial- suggestions for change in the structure of the
American corporation have come from several
outspoken former corporate CEOs. The two
that have received most attention are Harold
Geneen, retired CEO of ITT, and Harold Williams, former chairman of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and former CEO
of Norton Simon. Williams contends that the
ideal board of directors would include only one
company officer, the chief executive. All other

There is considerable precedent for an outside director chairing the board meetings. That
is the standard procedure at non-profit institutions such as hospitals, museums, and universities, many of which rival in size and complexity all but the largest for-profit corporations.
Also, many Western European companies normally follow this practice, as do many American companies with concentrated ownership on
the part of venture capitalists and other outside
investors.
Williams, unlike Nader, would not allocate
individual directorships to representatives of
employees, consumers, minorities, or other
groups. "It would be disastrous .... Constituency representative . . . makes the board a political body," according to Williams. Does his
proposal infringe on private property rights?
The former SEC chairman states that corporations are more than economic institutions
owned by shareholders: "Corporate America
is too important, and perceived as too powerful, to fail to address the kinds of issues that are
. ,13
noneconomic.

6
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Geneen would go further than Williams,
barring all members of management from
serving on the board of the corporation for
which they work. The CEO and other members of management would continue to attend
board meetings, but they would be there to re14
port to the board and to explain their actions.
Other Reform Proposals
In a variation of Geneen's approach, Walter
J. Salmon, of the Harvard Business School and
a veteran board member, suggests that the
boards of larger corporations be limited to
three inside directors - the chief executive officer (CEO), the chief operating officer (COO),
and the chief financial officer (CPO). As the
current leaders of the corporation, the CEO and
COO are there to communicate, explain, and
justify strategic direction to the outside directors. Because CFOs share fiduciary responsibility with the directors for the fmancial conduct of the corporation, they should also have a
15
seat on the board.
A more modest variation on the theme of
strengthening the role of the outside directors is
the Principles of Corporate Governance and
Structure proposed by the American Law Institute (ALI). The ALI proposed to replace voluntary arrangements on corporate governance,
as interpreted by the courts, with legislative
statutes and administrative regulations. For example, the ALI recommended that, as a matter
of law, a majority of the board members of
each large publicly held corporation (those with
at least 2,000 shareholders and $100 million in
total assets) must be outside directors. Following substantial criticism from the business
community, the ALI proposal has remained
. .&tor d"tscussion.
.
16
mere1y a b as1s
It does not seem likely that any of these sets
of detailed proposals for the reform of corporate governance will be adopted on a compul-
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sory basis. Yet, legislators continue to introduce proposals for legislating some of these
changes. In 1993, Representative Ed Markey
(D-Mass.) urged that the federal government
require that all board chairmen be outside directors. He would also limit the number of
boards that a director can serve on. In the
United Kingdom, the Cadbury Committee on
Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance has
urged that non-management (outside) directors
serve on only one board.
Voluntary Changes in the Boardroom

While the criticism of corporate governance
continues unabated, important changes in the
boardroom are being made on a voluntary basis. These adaptive adjustments have resulted
from significant shifts in the environment in
which corporations and their boards function.
First is increased government regulation and
the threat of further intervention. The second
influence is active concern with corporate governance by some large institutional investors
(especially state and local government employee pension funds). Other factors include
greater foreign competition, rising levels of
litigation by shareholders, and criticism from
the press. In part, these changes deflect or reduce the pressures for new statutes or regulations requiring compulsory modifications in
corporate governance. Also, the increased liability of corporate directors for their actions is
reinforcing the trend toward their greater involvement in company decision-making.
According to the head of a major consulting
firm, "Passive ceremonial directors are fast be. an endangered species.
. " 17 A survey of
commg
the boards of directors of large U.S. corporations concluded that "the days of the 'rubber
18
stamp' board are over. "
Clearly, many
boards are taking on a more active role.
9

Eight Basic Changes
Eight basic voluntary changes in the boardroom can be identified:
1. Outside directors have become a majority of most boards of large companies in
the United States, and the move toward
more outside directors continues. In 1938,
only one-half of industrial corporations had
majorities of outsiders on their boards. By
1992, the average corporate board had nine
outside directors and three inside directors.
Also, board size has declined somewhat, reflecting in part the reduced role of inside directors. In 1992, the typical board had 14 directors, down from 16 in 1982.
Some movement is also being made voluntarily toward the Geneen-Williams view on
board composition. Of the 100 large corporations analyzed in 1992 by the executive search
firm Spencer Stuart, eleven were comprised
entirely of outside directors except for the
chairman/CEO. In 1987, this condition was
true in only 3 of the 100 firms. Simultaneously, the prevalence of "dependent" outside
directors (those who also provide services to
the company) has diminished. In the 1970s,
the average board included a commercial
banker and/or an attorney. That is true in only
a small minority of instances in the 1990s. 19
2. A broader diversity of backgrounds is
evident in the type of persons serving on
corporate boards. Increased numbers of directors have public service, academic, and scientific experience. Boards also include rising
percentages of women and minorities. A survey of top company board placements in 1992
indicated that approximately 30 percent were
20
women or blacks.
During the same period,
the percentage of boards with ethnic minority
members rose from 11 percent to 26 percent,
those with academics from 36 percent to 52
percent, and those with former government officials from 12 percent to 31 percent.
10

Another trend in the composition of U.S.
boards of directors is the rising number of directors from other countries. In 1992, 22 of
the 100 large corporations surveyed by Spencer
Stuart had a total of 27 international outside directors.

A survey of top company board placements
in 1992 indicated that approximately
30 percent were women or blacks.

3. Auditing committees have become a
nearly universal phenomenon. Typically,
these fmancial oversight bodies are composed
entirely of independent outside directors (an absolute requirement for firms listed on the New
York Stock Exchange). The audit committees
have direct access to both outside and inside
auditors and usually review the financial aspects of company operations in great detail. As
recently as 1973, only one-half of large U.S.
corporations had auditing committees. Currently, the proportion is 99 percent.
4.
In many companies, nominating
committees propose both candidates for the
board and senior officers. These committees
usually have a strong majority of outside directors (typically, four out of five). However,
these statistics do little to illuminate the continuing powerful role of the CEO in initiating or
approving committee selections. In practice,
most outside directors are selected by the
chairman/CEO and in virtually all cases, he or
she must be agreeable to their appointment.
5. In most large companies, compensation committees evaluate the performance of
top executives and determine the terms and
conditions of their employment.
These
11

committees are composed largely or entirely of
outside directors. In practice, many of these
committees rely extensively on outside consultants whose compensation surveys often set the
framework for committee deliberations.
6. On average, about one out of five of
the larger companies have established publicpolicy committees on their boards. These
committees give board-level attention to company policies and performance on subjects of
special public concern. Topics with which
public-policy committees often deal include affirmative action and equal employment opportunity, employee health and safety, company
impact on the environment, corporate political
activities, consumer affairs, and ethics.
Pfizer, the large pharmaceutical firm, has
appointed a new vice president for corporate
governance. The company's expectation is that
this officer will be proactive in responding to
legislation and regulations in the field of corporate governance and will advise the top management on the latest thinking on corporate
21
structure and shareholder relations.
7. Internal management and accounting
control systems have been strengthened. In
part, the impetus has come from the need to
comply with the provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. The activities of the audit
committees surely are a reinforcing factor. As
a result, the flow of information to board members has been upgraded and expanded.
8. Recruiting directors has become more
difficult. Increasing the role and the remuneration of directors have helped make board
service more attractive. However, these positive factors are on occasion offset by a change
in the narrow, technical area of directors' liability insurance. In recent years, courts have
narrowed the scope of the business judgment
rule, which provides board discretion to board
members in carrying out their functions. The

resultant acceleration of lawsuits against corporate boards has increased the costs of the insurance companies that have previously covered
the bulk of such expenses. In turn, this has led
to a marked decline in the willingness of carriers to write directors' and officers' liability insurance policies. As a consequence, some directors have reduced the number of boards on
which they serve in order to concentrate on
their responsibilities on the remaining boards.

12
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Boards have traditionally responded
strongly when corporations have
faced real crises.

Boards have traditionally responded strongly
when corporations have faced real crises. In
the early 1990s, outside directors began taking
a more active stance in reacting to poor performance on the part of the managements reporting to them and thus to avoid the development of crisis situations. In 1992, the General
Motors board, led by outside directors, replaced the CEO and designated an outside director (a recently retired CEO of another major
enterprise) as nonexecutive chairman.
In 1993, IBM, after replacing its CEO, created a new committee of outside directors to
focus on corporate governance. The function
of the new committee is to nominate new directors, handle proposals from shareholders, and
oversee the functioning of the board. In the
same year, Eastman Kodak replaced its CEO
and formed a corporate directors committee of
outside directors to oversee its basic strategy.
An important and voluntary institutional
change occurred in 1994 when the board of di-

rectors of General Motors issued 28 "guidelines
on significant corporate governance issues. "
The GM guidelines formalize the stronger control over management that the board had moved
to in 1992. Specifics include designating a
"lead" outside director to chair three meetings
of independent directors a year, giving the
board rather than the CEO real authority to select new members, and a new director affairs
committee. The duties of that new committee
include assigning members to board committees
and evaluating the board's performance each
year. 22
Labor Empowerment on the Board
As a result of the financial difficulties encountered by many companies during the 1980s
and early 1990s, some labor unions were given
the authority to designate one or more members
of the firm's board of directors as part of an
overall package that contained reductions from
customary wage increases and often outright
cuts in labor compensation. In 1980, Chrysler
Corporation became the first major company in
the United States to elect a union leader to its
board. That was done in connection with a
package of union concessions to help the company to continue operating during a very difficult period.
In 1983, the Teamsters Union agreed to a
substantial lowering of wage and benefit levels
at Commercial Lovelace Motor Freight, Inc., a
company hard hit by competition from nonunion truckers. In return, workers were given
just over 50 percent of the stock and the right
to elect three of the seven members of the
board. At five other trucking firms, the Union
agreed to a similar package, but worker ownership was kept to less than 50 percent. In some
instances, the union-designated board members
have been retired executives from business and
government, avoiding conflicts of interest.

14

In 1993, several steel companies - Bethlehem, Wheeling-Pittsburgh, and LTV - agreed
to having a representative of the United Steelworkers Union serve on their boards. At about
the same time, Northwest Airlines and TWA
both agreed to give their employees a major
share of the corporation's ownership. As part
of a move out of bankruptcy, TWA gave its
employees a 45 percent ownership of the company plus four board seats. Northwest provided three board seats plus 37.5 percent of the
company's stock. Both airlines received several hundred million dollars of concessions in
labor costs.
Union memberships on corporate boards are
still isolated examples, and the entire subject
remains extremely controversial. Although the
concept of employee representation on the
board is common in Western Europe, it is not a
generally accepted notion in the United States.
In Germany, codetermination laws have required worker representation on the boards of
larger companies since 1951. However, that
nation has a long tradition of labor-management
cooperation. The fact that German worker
compensation averages higher than other industrialized nations is not an inducement to U.S.
firms to copy the example.
Such actions, although few, provide a powerful signal to top management that inadequate
performance can result in their replacement by
a hitherto supportive board of directors. It is
especially noteworthy that these changes in
management did not require a formal takeover
("change of control") with its ancillary legion
of expensive investment bankers, attorneys, and
accountants.
Strengthening the Board

Despite the progress that has been made in
recent years, most writers on the role of the
15

Recommendations
The following suggestions are offered in the
spirit of strengthening the corporate board
without setting up a mechanism competitive
with the company management:

We must recognize the extent to which
takeover battles have occurred because of
the cumulative inaction of some boards of directors. It is easy enough to denounce financial entrepreneurs who have little interest in the
production of goods and services, but who
profit - often in the form of "greenmail" merely from making unsolicited takeover bids.
But if they are opportunists, we must ask
whether existing board and management practices have created these opportunities. A clue
is given, perhaps inadvertently, by the Roundtable's lament that a successful corporate defense may involve drastic restructuring to
maximize share value in the short run. Without
endorsing the desirability of such a change, we
can wonder whether it does reflect the true desires of many shareholders who indeed want to
maximize share value in the short run.
Despite their attraction to defending managements, legislative proposals to make unfriendly takeovers more difficult do not deal
with the fundamental need to respond to the
desires of the shareholders. That is both the
basic responsibility of the board and the key to
its potential power. Corporate officials, both
board members and officers, may forget that
shareholders continually vote with their dollars.
The less frequently key issues are presented to
the shareholders, the more likely they are to resort to their ultimate weapon - selling their
holdings in a company whose policies they
disagree with.
Observe that some of the problems of the
takeover targets may have arisen from the
desire to be more socially responsible. Examples include Cummins Engine and Control
Data Corporation, both of which suffered under
management with an unusual interest in broad
social problems. Much of the modern management literature refers to the need for top
management to balance the desires of employ-
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corporate board reach some variation of the
same dual conclusion: the board of directors is
a vital part of the business firm, but it often
does an inadequate job of carrying out its responsibility to represent the shareholders.
The result can be a policy vacuum, which
provides opportunity for those outside of the
corporation. Dramatic moves have been made
to take advantage of the fundamental shortcoming of corporate boards. These responses have
come from the so-called predatory raiders who
attempt to take advantage of the latent support
of shareholders for changes in the status quo.

Predatory raiders take advantage of the
latent support of shareholders for
changes in the status quo.

Of course, corporate managements view this
phenomenon differently. A spokesman for the
Business Roundtable describes the strategy of
"professional raiders" as waging "blitzkrieg
warfare" devised to "outflank the corporate
board of directors and stampede the stockhold23
There is no need to glamorize the acers. "
tivities or the motives of the raiders while noting the positive contributions they make. One
of the most successful takeover specialists describes his efforts as "acting in pursuit of personal financial gain and not out of altruism . . .
I do it to make money."

ees, customers, suppliers, public-interest
groups, and shareholders. For example, the
Committee for Economic Development, in its
widely circulated report on the social responsibility of business, stated that the modem professional manager is regarded as a trustee balancing the interests of many diverse
participants and constituents in the enterprise
(shareholders are only listed as one among
many worthy groups).
The chief executive of a large corporation has
the problem of reconciling the demands of
employees for more wages and improved
benefit plans, customers for lower prices and
greater values, vendors for higher prices,
government for more taxes, stockholders for
higher dividends and greater capital appreciation.24
In the case of Control Data, after an annual
loss of $680 million, a new CEO replaced his
predecessor who had stressed corporate social
responsibility. The new CEO bluntly stated
that the previous management had not always
"thought in terms of building shareholder
value" and had not built a culture of controlling
25
costs.
The heart of a positive response to the
dissatisfaction with corporate perfonnance is
for directors to act more fully as fiduciaries
of the shareholders, as the law requires. The
same authorities who are almost universally
critical of the way in which corporate boards
operate are unanimous in their belief that a
well-functioning governing board is essential to
the future of the modern corporation. Virtually
no one has concluded that the board of directors has outlived its usefulness. Even such
business critics as Ralph Nader would lodge
majority responsibility for governing the corporation in a revitalized board of directors.
18

The most fundamental need in corporate
governance is educational - get senior corporate officers to understand their high stake
in enhancing the role of the board of directors. There would be fewer challenges to the
existing managements of their companies if
more boards acted from a day-to-day concern
with the interests of their shareholders. The
benefits of a more active board will not be attained without costs. Achieving a stronger and
more effective board means sharing the authority now lodged in the CEO - and at times
reaching somewhat different decisions. But
that does not require the establishment of a
competitive power center. It does mean being
more conscious of the desires of shareholders,
and of the need to keep them more fully informed. Only one person - the chief executive - can guide the corporation's day-to-day
activities. That function cannot be performed
by a committee.

Achieving a stronger and more
effective board means sharing the
authority now lodged in the CEO.

Successful directors learn to monitor and
question while creating an atmosphere of confidence in the management. Simultaneously, a
truly secure CEO will not attempt to stifle
criticism by individual directors. The legendary Alfred P. Sloan reportedly made the following statement at a General Motors board
meeting:
Gentlemen, I take it we are all in complete
agreement on the decision here. . . . Then I
propose we postpone further discussion of
19

tors should not represent banks, law firms,
customers, or the community in which the corporation happens to have its headquarters.
Such actual or potential conflicts of interest
should be avoided. A strong but minority representation of knowledgeable insiders should
continue. Nominating committees would do
well to bear in mind the advice of management
scholar S. Prakash Sethi that a board of directors is not a debating society: "While it is
normal to have different viewpoints and expertise represented on the board, it is illogical to
27
represent special interests on the board. "
Opinions differ sharply on whether the CEO
should also serve as chairman of the board. In
my personal view, the board chairman should

usually be an outside director in order to assure
the independence of the board. Much depends
on the attitude of the CEO to the board and to
the specific challenges facing the company.
There is no compelling need to modify the
traditional arrangement in the case of a wellfunctioning company whose CEO also maintains an open, healthy relation with the board.
In such circumstances, it would be silly to
change merely for the sake of change.
However, when the company is not performing well or when the CEO regards the
board as merely a legal necessity, then a departure from the status quo is warranted. Under
such circumstances, it would be helpful if the
presiding officer had relevant experience - the
recently retired CEO of another firm or of a
large non-profit institution, for instance. A few
other senior members of the management also
can be useful board members. The chief operating officer would be appropriate. His or
her presence on the board does not give rise to
the problems that occur when operating officials are made board members - when they
participate in reviewing their own operations
and those of their colleagues. Because of the
crucial relationship of financial reporting to the
monitoring function, the chief financial officer
probably also should be a board member.
None of these inside directors can be expected
to differ frequently with the CEO, thus emphasizing the need for a substantial representation
of outside, independent directors.
Where the board chairmanship is filled by
an outside director, the position should be a
private role whereas the CEO should represent
the firm to the public. Only the CEO and his
or her subordinates can truly represent the firm
in public arenas since they bear the responsibility and possess the authority to conduct the
business of the company. This approach requires a high degree of good will on the part of

20
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this matter until our next meeting to give ourselves time to develop disagreement and perhaps gain some understanding of what the
decision is all about. 26

What about the composition of the board? Experience teaches us to be leery of simple solutions. An example is the popular proposition
that only outside directors should serve on a
corporate board, with the possible exception of
the CEO. Diversity of talent is a strength in
the management of an economic organization.

Retired officers of a company do not belong on its board. It is enough to have independent outside directors looking over the
shoulders of the management, without the previous generation of management also doing so.
The outsiders have less stake in defending the
status quo than do the retirees who may have
created existing conditions. There are advantages in retired corporate officers serving as directors of other companies, so long as they are
not competitors of or suppliers to the company
from which they have retired.

Corporate boards should consist primarily of independent outsiders. Outside direc-

both outside directors and corporate officers.
The indispensable factor in ensuring an effective board is that directors and management be
committed to making the board work. A great
deal of effort and discretion is required on the
part of outside directors to carry on an active
and constructive role that is simultaneously
probing and supportive.

The indispensable factor is that directors
and management be committed to
making the board work.

The points just made for board service apply
with equal force to committee work. Compared to board meetings, directors are more
likely to take the initiative in committees.
Some institutional protections of the independence of board committees are necessary and are
now often in place. Specifically, the audit
committee - even if the corporation is not
listed on the New York Stock Exchange should consist entirely of independent outside
directors. The compensation committee, which
passes on the pay and fringe benefits of top
management, should be similarly constituted.
Also, the nominating committee, with a key
role in selecting directors and senior executives, should be comprised of independent outside members.
In contrast, the rmance and public-policy
committees can benefit from a balance between insiders and outsiders. The management directors bring a special institutional
knowledge, while the outside directors hopefully operate with a wider framework. Another
reason for the mixed finance committee is that
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it provides a built-in opportunity to balance the
pressures for dividends and retained earnings.
Often many shareholders emphasize the shortrun benefits of increased income, whereas
management is more concerned about investing
in the company's future growth. Also, the officers may simply find it easier or at least more
satisfactory to use retained earnings rather than
going to the credit markets. For the typical
business firm, this is not an either-or choice
'
but a case of balancing two important and basic
considerations.
The subject of board turnover is often a
painful matter. A directorship is not a type of
civil-service appointment, but it is not easy to
dislodge a long-term director. Long-time directors become so accustomed to the existing way
of doing business that they viscerally oppose
innovation on the oldest bureaucratic grounds:
"We have never done it that way."
CEOs and other busy professionals are rationing more carefully than in the past the
number of boards on which they serve. Likewise, boards are more selective in their new
appointments.
Outside directors should be
truly independent. They should not also simultaneously be paid consultants or advisors to the
management. They should not have their own
interests in mind, be it supporting the local
community or advocating more generous treatment of corporate executives generally. Outside directors need to bear in mind that, in a
very special way, the future of the corporation
is in their hands - so long as they serve the
desires of the shareholders.

A Look to the Future

A growing array of external forces impinges
on the contemporary corporation. Some of
these factors are financial and economic, focus23

ing on the traditional functions of business enterprise. Others are social and political, dealing with business responses to other issues.
Together, these influences will likely produce
significant further changes in the composition
of corporate boards of directors to increase the
active involvement of corporate directors in the
decisionmaking of the business firm.

A growing array of external forces will
likely produce significant further changes
in the composition of corporate
boards of directors.
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